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Abstract
Deception detection has ubiquitously focussed upon detecting deceit in
the individual, whether in national security, forensic or business-related
environments. In contrast an understanding of how to identify deception
committed by multiple individuals or groups challenging strategic
interests has been neglected. In this article - to enhance understanding
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
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of practitioners working across security, intelligence and forensic areas -
a process of psychological synthesis is advocated. Psychological
synthesis incorporates a multitude of approaches reflecting contextual
requirements towards deception detection across verbal/linguistic
behavior, non-verbal behavior, online interactions and intelligence
analysis approaches. These combined with in-depth understanding of
individuals’ cultures, personality and manner of presentation can be
understood in challenging environments. Juxtaposed to these factors
psychological synthesis considers how intelligence, surveillance and
evidence may be used in detecting deception and identifying links
between individuals engaging in deception and related activities. An
illustration of how such an approach may work is provided through a
scenario of a terrorist incident and how a tailored deception detection
approach may seek to counter such a threat.
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Introduction  
Deception occurs across tactical and strategic environments presenting 
challenges within forensic and security domains.  Tactical forms of deception are 
associated with individual acts and occur across multiple contexts, while strategic 
forms are part of larger operations targeting organizations and infrastructure.1  
Deception is proposed to comprise of simulation and dissimulation.2  Simulation 
is considered to be showing false information to the target through mimicking, 
inventing, and decoying strategies.3  Mimicking tactics seek to deceive the target 
through imitating reality, inventing tactics create something new, which is false, 
and decoying tactics deceive the target through diverting attention to another 
area.4  Dissimulation means to deceive the target through hiding information by 
masking, repackaging, and dazzling tactics.5  Masking aims to hide information 
by making it invisible to detection, repackaging hides reality through disguising 
and modifying appearance, and dazzling hides reality through presenting a range 
of options to blur reality in sense-making.6 
 
In contrast to strategic and military deception, psychological approaches to 
deception have focused primarily on detecting deception in individuals rather 
than conducting deception operations against adversaries.  Psychological theories 
of individual-level deception detection have focused either upon isolated cues to 
deception that are uncovered passively through examining behavior or more 
recent active interviewing approaches which aim to elicit cues to deception.  Both 
passive and active approaches have targeted assessments of veracity towards 
individuals who may pose a threat across criminal and security related 
environments.  These approaches may prove useful in detecting deception in 
individual cases; however, if individuals are part of a larger deception then 
additional challenges in uncovering deception will occur.  Such challenges relate 
to deception conducted by a variety of actors covering both state and non-state 
groups, proxies and loosely aligned collectives.  This article examines deception 
detection approaches across strategic environments, historical and current 
approaches to verbal, non-verbal, and online individual interactions.  It advocates 
a focus towards how such approaches, combined with understanding the motives 
                                                     
1 William Glenney, “Military deception in the information age: Scale matters,” in Brooke 
Harrington (ed.), Deception: From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2009), 254-274. 
2 J. Bowyer Bell, “Toward a theory of deception,” International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence 16 (2003): 244,279; Whaley, Barton, “Toward a general theory of 
deception,” Journal of Strategic Studies 5 (1982): 178-192. 
3 Whaley, “Toward a general theory of deception.” 
4 Bell, “Toward a theory of deception”; Macdonald, Scot, Propaganda and Information 
Warfare in the Twenty-First Century: Altered Images and Deception Operations (London: 
Routledge, 2004); Whaley, “Toward a general theory of deception.” 
5 Whaley, “Toward a general theory of deception.” 
6 Bell, “Toward a theory of deception”; Macdonald, Propaganda and Information Warfare in 
the Twenty-First Century: Altered Images and Deception Operations; Whaley, “Toward a 
general theory of deception.” 
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and context behind deception collectively may be deployed against strategic level 
deception.  To illustrate how such approaches may combine, a scenario of a 
terrorist incident is presented with potential strategies to how deception in such a 
context may be detected. 
 
Strategic Deception Detection 
Strategic level deception is considered as deception that affects the critical 
infrastructure, including management structures of organizations and such 
deception may be wide-ranging or focused upon achieving specified goals.7  To 
identify deception, there is a need for knowledge of the adversary alongside 
strong intelligence and analysis of their behavior and patterns.8  Deception 
detection may be passive and active.9  Passive deception detection consists of a 
continual examination of reality seeking false patterns and hidden threats 
alongside evidence of adversary deception planning.10  Active deception detection 
consists of measures of identifying those who plan deception based upon their 
background history or perceived future intentions.11 Counterpropaganda, 
including disinformation, is a neglected area of focus within operating 
environments. Current strategies are focused towards reactively identifying 
adversary propaganda and how situational awareness is shaped rather than 
proactively identifying counterpropaganda, which may mitigate threats.12 
 
Deception may be detected through identifying elements of the deceiver’s plans.13  
Identifying patterns involved in misdirection, identifying adversaries involved in 
an operating environment, the intentions they may have, what the payoff or gain 
may be, where the events take place, adversary strength, adversary style and the 
information channel involved in communicating the deception.14  All of these 
areas may highlight vulnerabilities in an adversary’s deception operation and in 
turn may exploit the target if undetected. 
 
                                                     
7 Roy Godson and James Wirtz, “Strategic Denial and Deception,” in Roy Godson and James 
Wirtz (eds.), Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge (London: 
Transaction Publishers, 2002), 1-14; Abram Shulsky, “Elements of strategic denial and 
deception,” in Roy Godson and James Wirtz (eds.), Strategic Denial and Deception: The 
Twenty-First Century Challenge (London: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 15-33. 
8 Christian Cali and Marc Romanych, “Counterpropaganda: An important capability for joint 
forces,” IO Sphere (Fall, 2005): 11-13. 
9 Bell, “Toward a theory of deception.” 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Cali and Romanych, “Counterpropaganda: An important capability for joint forces”; 
Godson, and Wirtz, “Strategic denial and deception.” 
13 Bell, J. Bowyer, Cheating: Deception in War & Magic, Games & Sport, Sex & Religion, 
Business & Con Games, Politics & Espionage, Art & Science (New York: St Martin’s Press, 
1982); Barton Whaley and Jeffrey Busby, “Detecting deception: Practice, practitioners, and 
theory,” in Roy Godson and James Wirtz (eds.), Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-
First Century Challenge (London: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 181-221. 
14 Ibid. 
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Intelligence Approaches to Deception Detection 
Approaches towards assessing intelligence and detecting deception include 
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH), and techniques outlined by Barton 
Whaley and Jeff Busby.15  Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) consists of a 
series of steps firstly involving the identification of possible hypotheses. Second 
evidence and assumptions are listed for and against each hypothesis. Third 
tentative conclusions are drawn about the likelihood of each hypothesis, 
including analysis of the sensitivity of the conclusion to significant evidence. Last, 
the identification of future observations that would confirm or eliminate the 
hypotheses is made.16  Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) has been applied 
to historical incidents of deception including the D-Day landings and the Battle of 
Midway.17  However, ACH may increase vulnerability to adversary deception 
through weighing hypotheses upon evidence that may be false, and further 
confirmation biases may occur if evidence fits with multiple hypotheses.18  To 
counter confirmation biases and aid decision-making there should be an 
increased emphasis on seeking refutations for hypotheses rather than 
confirmations.19  Although ACH may appear as a promising method of supporting 
decision-making processes involved in detecting deception, there is a need to 
incorporate behavioral cues to deception. 
 
Alternative analysis approaches including, ACH, have limitations in identifying 
significant events, and advocated methods of testing alternatives have not been 
regularly employed with frequent bias towards the most consistent alternative 
even if there are potential incongruities.20  To enhance alternative analysis 
approaches there is a requirement for:  
 
 increasing analytic imagination by testing many hypotheses;  
 independently check source vetting for increased accuracy in deception 
detection;  
 the assessment of missing data to determine validity and check for denial 
and;  
                                                     
15 Heuer, Richards, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 
1999); Karl Spielmann, “Strengthening intelligence threat analysis,” International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 25 (2012): 19-43; Frank Stech, and Christopher Elsässer, 
Deception Detection by Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, McLean, Virginia: The Mitre 
Corporation, 2003; Stech, Frank, and Christopher Elsässer, Midway Revisited: Detecting 
Deception by Analysis of Competing Hypothesis, Mclean, Virginia: The Mitre Corporation, 
2004. 
16 Stech, and Elsässer, Deception Detection by Analysis of Competing Hypotheses. 
17 Ibid; Stech, and  Elsässer, Midway Revisited: Detecting Deception by Analysis of 
Competing Hypothesis. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Richards Heuer, “Limits of intelligence analysis,” Orbis 49 (2005): 75-94. 
20 Spielmann, “Strengthening intelligence threat analysis.” 
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 make an unbiased assessment of the dominant views evidence and 
reasoning.21   
 
However, further synthesis is required to build upon psychological approaches to 
deception detection as part of this process – particularly in building from an 
individual’s deception to uncover strategic threats.  Findings need further to be 
made clear to practitioners and lay audiences.22 
 
One proposed theory of counter-deception examines techniques employable 
across multiple contexts.23  Nine categories of cues (pattern, players, intention, 
payoff, place, time, strength, style, and channel) are argued to be elements that 
the deceiver may conceal or reveal during deception.  The major principle of this 
approach is the ‘plus-minus rule’ where a series of the above characteristics may 
indicate deception by their presence or absence.24  Real-world deception may not 
enable clear differentiation as to a characteristics presence or absence and the 
‘congruity-incongruity rule’ is advanced to suggest where incongruity occurs 
deception maybe as well.25  Multiple techniques may be applied to deception 
detection:  
 
 ‘Locard’s exchange principle’–where a deceiver may leave evidence at the 
scene and takes some away;  
 ‘verification’–of the deception;  
 ‘the law of multiple sensors’–examination of multiple channels for deceit;  
 ‘passive and active detection’–the examination of current evidence and the 
search for further evidence;  
 pre-detection–where understanding an adversary’s deception modus 
operandi, goals and capabilities may uncover potential deception;  
 ‘penetration and counterespionage’–uncovering an adversary’s plans 
through espionage and neutralizing adversary operatives to protect target 
infrastructure;  
 ‘the prepared mind and intuition’–where preparation for deception and 
the intuition to detect it enables counter-deception and;  
 ‘indirect thinking and the third option’–the ability to detect potential 
adversary options for deception is required for counter-deception.26   
 
                                                     
21 Ibid. 
22 Karl Spielmann, “Using enhanced analytic techniques for threat analysis: A case study 
illustration,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 27 (2014): 132-
155. 
23 Whaley, and Busby, “Detecting deception: Practice, practitioners, and theory.” 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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One final element is the ‘Ombudsman Method’ where irrelevances, discrepancies, 
and misdirection are examined alongside indirect thinking and intuition.27  This 
approach to deception detection appears promising; however, there is a need for 
the incorporation of psychological principles of deception detection and decision-
making. 
 
Bennett and Waltz’s counter-deception approach examines ‘intelligence 
functions’ including deception cues, deception detection and exposure, adversary 
discovery and penetration alongside ‘operational functions’ incorporating 
mitigation and exploitation of adversary deception.  These functions are argued to 
be interdependent and present deception as a continuum rather than individual 
elements.28  Human reasoning and self-assessment of own beliefs and methods of 
intelligence gathering and intelligence-gathering channels will identify potential 
vulnerabilities potentially mitigating the effects of deception.29  Multiple channels 
of information should be used to ensure a greater range of human intelligence 
(HUMINT) with which to assess credibility.30  Threat and situation assessments 
are required to understand the influences and circumstances in which deception 
may occur and such approaches parallel recent psychological approaches to 
understanding high-stakes future intent. 31  Bennett and Waltz recommend 
incongruity testing and ACH as tools for detecting deception, and combined with 
psychological deception detection methods will enable a more accurate credibility 
assessment.32 
 
Tactical Deception Detection 
Verbal Deception Detection 
Verbal deception detection approaches focus upon examining statements, 
typically derived from interviews or online content.33  Traditional approaches 
have focused upon examining statements taken from interviews through 
techniques including Statement Validity Analysis (SVA) and Reality Monitoring 
(RM). Recent Differential Recall Enhancement (DRE) approaches seek to 
increase the behavioral differences between truth-tellers and deceivers, whilst 
                                                     
27 Ibid. 
28 Bennett, Michael, and Edward Waltz, Counterdeception Principles and Applications for 
National Security (Artech House: London, 2007). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid; Gozna, Lynsey, and Rebecca Lawday, “An applied scientist-practitioner model for the 
assessment of high-stake deceptive future intent in forensic and security settings: 
Incorporating critical consideration of personality, motive, mindet and risk,” poster presented 
at DECEPTICON 2015: International Conference on Deceptive Behavior, University of 
Cambridge, Cambridge, UK, August 24-26, 2015. 
32 Bennett and  Waltz, Counterdeception Principles and Applications for National Security. 
33 Aldert Vrij, “Verbal lie detection tools: Statement validity analysis, reality monitoring and 
scientific content analysis,” in Par Anders Granhag, Aldert Vrij and Brun0 Verschuere (eds.), 
Detecting deception: Current challenges and cognitive approaches (Chichester: Wiley 
Blackwell, 2015), 4-35. 
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Forensic Statement Analysis and other linguistic analysis approaches have sought 
to examine linguistic differences between truth-tellers and deceivers.34  
 
Statement Validity Analysis (SVA) involves a review of relevant information, a 
semi-structured interview, criteria-based content analysis (CBCA) and a Validity 
Checklist to assess findings, focusing on behaviors that truth-tellers are more 
likely to perform than deceivers do.35  In studies of CBCA, some criteria are 
present more often and have more support in lie-truth discrimination.  For 
example, ‘unstructured production’ and ‘contextual embedding’ appear in more 
than half of studies involving CBCA, whilst ‘self-deprecation’, ‘related external 
associations’ and ‘pardoning the perpetrator’ appear in only a handful.36 Such 
differences in the CBCA literature may in part reflect the studies being variously 
conducted as field or laboratory research.  There are limitations to SVA with 
scoring, reliability of criteria, establishment of ground truth, lack of a 
standardized training program, vulnerabilities to countermeasures and further 
effects generated by culture, context, and personality.37 
 
RM proposes that recollections of real experiences are developed from perceptual 
processes whereas false experiences developed from our imagination will be 
cognitive in nature enabling discrimination between truthful and deceptive 
accounts.38  Reality Monitoring (RM) has shown similar levels of deception 
                                                     
34 Kevin Colwell, Cheryl Hiscock-Anisman, and Jacquelyn Fede, “Assessment criteria 
indicative of deception: An example of the new paradigm of differential recall enhancement,” 
in Barry Cooper, Dorothee Griesel and Marguerite Ternes (eds.), Applied Issues in 
Investigative Interviewing, Eyewitness Memory, and Credibility Assessment (London: 
Springer, 2013), 259-291; Charles Morgan, Kevin Colwell and Gary Hazlett, “Efficacy of 
forensic statement analysis in distinguishing truthful from deceptive eyewitness accounts of 
highly stressful events,” Journal of Forensic Sciences 56 (2011): 1227-1234; Charles Morgan, 
Yaron Rabinowitz, Deborah Hilts, Craig Weller and Vladimir Coric, “Efficacy of Modified 
Cognitive Interviewing, Compared to Human Judgments in Detecting Deception Related to 
Bio-threat Activities,” Journal of Strategic Security 6 (2013): 100-119; Charles Morgan, Yaron 
Rabinowitz, Robert Leidy and Vladimir Coric, “Efficacy of combining interview techniques in 
detecting deception related to bio-threat issues,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law 32 (2014): 
269-285;  Charles Morgan, Yaron Rabinowitz, Beau Palin and Kirk Kennedy, “Who should 
you trust? Discriminating genuine from deceptive eyewitness accounts,” The Open 
Criminology Journal under review; Jeffrey Hancock, Lauren Curry, Saurabh Goorha and 
Michael Woodworth, “On lying and being lied to: A linguistic analysis of deception in 
computer-mediated communication,” Discourse Processes 45 (2008): 1-23; Matthew 
Newman, James Pennebaker, Diane Berry and Jane Richards “Lying words: Predicting 
deception from linguistic style,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 29 (2003): 665-
675. 
35 Vrij, “Verbal lie detection tools: Statement validity analysis, reality monitoring and 
scientific content analysis.” 
36 Stephen Porter and Leanne ten Brinke, “The truth about lies: What works in detecting high-
stakes deception?” Legal and Criminological Psychology 15 (2010): 57-75. 
37 Aldert Vrij, “Criteria-based content analysis: A qualitative review of the first 37 studies,” 
Psychology, Public Policy and Law 11 (2005): 3-41; Aldert Vrij, Wendy Kneller, and 
Samantha Mann, “The effect of informing liars about criteria-based content analysis on their 
ability to deceive CBCA-raters,” Legal and Criminological Psychology 5 (2000): 57-70. 
38 Gary Bond and Adrienne Lee, “Language of lies in prison: Linguistic classification of 
prisoners’ truthful and deceptive natural language,” Applied Cognitive Psychology 19 (2005): 
213-329; Siegfried Sporer, “Reality monitoring and detection of deception,” in Par Anders 
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detection accuracy and similar limitations to SVA while differences between real 
and imagined events may fade over time and behavioral differences may actually 
be due to interviewing techniques rather than RM.39 
 
Differential Recall Enhancement (DRE) approaches focus on increasing 
behavioral differences between liars and truth-tellers using cognitive mnemonics, 
questioning strategy and use of evidence, for example, Assessment Criteria 
Indicative of Deception (ACID), strategic use of evidence (SUE), and cognitive 
approaches.40 Differential Recall Enhancement (DRE) is considered to assist 
honest people in their recall and provides more detailed and verbose statements 
whilst deceptive people work harder to maintain credibility and over-rely on 
short, carefully constructed narratives.41  The mnemonic section of statements 
can lead to an increase in accuracy of the order of 10-27 percent in veracity 
assessment – suggesting that DRE techniques are useful for detecting deception 
in investigative interviewing.42  DRE techniques may overcome the paucity of 
valid cues to deception, although their application outside of interview specific 
contexts will be limited. 43 
 
The ACID technique analyses the admittance of potential errors, length of 
responses and RM criteria associated with differences due to memory, impression 
management, and unique contextual and internal/external details as they appear 
during a police investigative interview.44  The Reality Interview (RI) increases an 
interviewee’s cognitive load to elicit cues to deception and to challenge 
impression management strategies.45  There is evidence that the ACID approach 
can accurately classify 86.8 percent of statements (78.9 percent truthful and 94.7 
                                                     
Granhag and Leif Strömwall (eds.), The Detection of Deception in Forensic Contexts 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 64-102; Vrij, Aldert, Detecting Lies and 
Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities(Chichester: Wiley, 2008). 
39 Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman and Fede,  “Assessment criteria indicative of deception: An 
example of the new paradigm of differential recall enhancement.”; Marcia Johnson, Mary Ann 
Foley, Aurora Suengas and Carol Raye, “Phenomenal characteristics of memories for 
perceived and imagined autobiographical events,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General 117 (1988): 371-376; Vrij, Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities. 
40 Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman and Fede, “Assessment criteria indicative of deception: An 
example of the new paradigm of differential recall enhancement.”; 
Par Anders Granhag and Maria Hartwig, “The strategic use of evidence technique: A 
conceptual overview,” in Par Anders Granhag, Aldert Vrij and Bruno Verschuere (eds.), 
Detecting Deception Current Challenges and Cognitive Approaches (Chichester: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2015), 231-251; Aldert Vrij, “A cognitive approach to lie detection,” in Par Anders 
Granhag, Aldert Vrij and Bruno Verschuere (eds.), Detecting Deception Current Challenges 
and Cognitive Approaches (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), 205-229. 
41 Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman and Fede, “Assessment criteria indicative of deception: An 
example of the new paradigm of differential recall enhancement.” 
42 Ibid. 
43 Maria Hartwig and Charles Bond, “Why do lie-catchers fail? A lens model meta-analysis of 
human lie judgements,” Psychological Bulletin 137 (2011): 643-659. 
44 Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman and Fede, “Assessment criteria indicative of deception: An 
example of the new paradigm of differential recall enhancement.” 
45 Ibid. 
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percent deceptive) and has the potential to be applied across cultures.46  
However, the ACID technique is limited when individuals are questioned about 
their attitudes and intent, in uncovering concealed information, and when an 
individual believes or is mistaken in what they are saying.47  Validation in applied 
contexts is therefore required although research into its application to online 
environments is emerging.48 
 
Use of evidence to increase behavioral differences between truth-tellers and 
deceivers has led to the development of strategic and tactical interviewing 
approaches49.  Strategic and tactical interviewing approaches attempt to counter 
suspects’ strategies by enabling the process of free recall before a challenge phase 
where varying strengths of evidence are presented which may highlight 
inconsistencies within suspects’ accounts and between accounts and evidence.50  
Tactical interviewing approaches are suggested to be more cognitively demanding 
than strategic, potentially enabling greater behavioral differences between truth-
tellers and deceivers. 51  However, the contexts in which these approaches can be 
usefully applied tend toward interviews concerning serious allegations where 
planning and time can be used effectively by interviewers.  The application of 
such techniques in the online environment is presently unknown but appears to 
have potential in dyadic interactions. 
 
Cognitive approaches increase behavioral differences between liars and truth-
tellers through asking cognitively demanding and unanticipated questions to 
circumvent deceivers’ preparations.52  Cognitively demanding questions focus on 
reverse order recall and maintenance of eye contact whilst unanticipated 
questions have focused on sketch drawing to enhance behavioral differences 
between truth-tellers and liars.53  Although validation in applied settings is 
required such techniques may be useful in uncovering verbal deception in 
interaction whilst application to areas outside of conversational interaction and 
other communication channels is more difficult to assess. 
 
                                                     
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Coral Dando and Ray Bull, “Maximising opportunities to detect verbal deception: Training 
police officers to interview tactically,” Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender 
Profiling 8 (2011): 189-202; Maria Hartwig, Par Anders Granhag, Leif Strömwall and Ola 
Kronkvist, “Strategic use of evidence during police interviews: When training to detect 
deception works,” Law and Human Behavior 30 (2006): 603-619. 
50 Dando and Bull, “Maximising opportunities to detect verbal deception: Training police 
officers to interview tactically,”; Granhag and Hartwig, “The strategic use of evidence 
technique: A conceptual overview.” 
51 Dando and Bull, “Maximising opportunities to detect verbal deception: Training police 
officers to interview tactically.” 
52 Vrij, “A cognitive approach to lie detection.” 
53 Ibid. 
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Forensic statement analysis examines narrative accounts of events though 
focusing on response length, unique word count, and type-token ration (the ratio 
of unique word count to response length).54  Current application of these 
techniques has sought to identify differences between truth-tellers and deceivers 
related to biological threats at both group and low-base rate conditions, which 
more accurately reflect the reality of such threats.55  Forensic statement analysis 
has further application to distinguishing genuine and deceptive eyewitness 
accounts, including the input of false information.56  Examining the credibility of 
claims is crucial in strategic environments as passively accepting presented 
information may enable exploitation by the deceiver. 
 
Linguistic techniques for analyzing behavioral differences between truth-tellers 
and deceivers have focused upon analyzing narrative to understand underlying 
thoughts, motives, and emotions across real world and mediated environments.57  
Further, analysis of language change in online communication has enabled the 
identification of cues to deceit, including potential cues to deception related to 
insider threat and linguistic markers for radical violence.58  In linguistic patterns 
in synchronous computer-mediated communication (CMC), deceivers may use a 
greater number of words, sense-based words, and other-oriented pronouns and 
use less self-oriented words when lying than when telling the truth.59  Increasing 
                                                     
54 Morgan, Colwell and Hazlett, “Efficacy of forensic statement analysis in distinguishing 
truthful from deceptive eyewitness accounts of highly stressful events”; Morgan, Rabinowitz, 
Hilts, Weller and Coric, “Efficacy of Modified Cognitive Interviewing, Compared to Human 
Judgments in Detecting Deception Related to Bio-threat Activities”; Morgan, Rabinowitz, 
Leidy and  Coric, “Efficacy of combining interview techniques in detecting deception related 
to bio-threat issues”; Morgan, Rabinowitz, Palin and Kennedy, “Who should you trust? 
Discriminating genuine from deceptive eyewitness accounts.” 
55 Morgan, Rabinowitz, Leidy and Coric, “Efficacy of combining interview techniques in 
detecting deception related to bio-threat issues”; Morgan, Rabinowitz, Hilts, Weller and 
Coric, “Efficacy of Modified Cognitive Interviewing, Compared to Human Judgments in 
Detecting Deception Related to Bio-threat Activities.” 
56 Morgan, Colwell and Hazlett, “Efficacy of forensic statement analysis in distinguishing 
truthful from deceptive eyewitness accounts of highly stressful events”; Morgan, Rabinowitz, 
Palin and Kennedy, “Who should you trust? Discriminating genuine from deceptive 
eyewitness accounts.” 
57 Newman, Pennebaker, Berry and Richards “Lying words: Predicting deception from 
linguistic style”; Bond and Lee, “Language of lies in prison: Linguistic classification of 
prisoners’ truthful and deceptive natural language.” 
58 Hancock, Curry, Goorha and Woodworth, “On lying and being lied to: A linguistic analysis 
of deception in computer-mediated communication”; Catalina Toma and Jeffrey Hancock, 
“What lies beneath: The linguistic traces of deception in online dating profiles,” Journal of 
Communication 62 (2012): 78-97; Lina Zhou, Judee Burgoon, Jay Nunamaker and Doug 
Twitchell, “Automating linguistics-based cues for detecting deception in text-based 
asynchronous computer-mediated communication,” Group Decision and Negotiation 13 
(2004): 81-106; Paul Taylor, Coral Dando, Thomas Ormerod, Linden Ball, Marissa Jenkins, 
Alexandra Sandham and Tarek Menacere, “Detecting insider threats through language 
change,” Law and Human Behavior 37 (2013): 267-275; Katie Cohen, Fredrik Johansson, 
Lisa Kaati and Jonas Mork, “Detecting linguistic markers for radical violence in social media,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 26 (2014): 246-256. 
59 Hancock, Curry, Goorha and Woodworth, “On lying and being lied to: A linguistic analysis 
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the number of words may be used by deceivers to appear more credible or as a 
strategy of distracting the receiver from inconsistencies in narrative, while other 
tactics may involve the deceiver distancing themselves from their behavior. 
 
Non-Verbal Deception Detection 
Non-verbal approaches have focused upon detecting deception through 
examining facial expressions, including micro-expressions and body language.60  
However non-verbal cues are potentially rare and do not guarantee the presence 
of deception.  Furthermore, assigning such cues as being ‘deceptive’, as distinct 
from idiosyncratic behavior or forms of arousal may lead to error.  Although 
discernible differences in facial expressions may be specific to high stake 
environments such as appealing for the return of missing loved ones, an 
awareness of the manifestation of genuine emotions is applicable to assessing 
veracity in interpersonal and online domains.61 
 
Micro-expressions are considered universal and comprise seven composite facial 
expressions of particular emotional experience (happiness, surprise, sadness, 
fear, disgust, contempt, and anger) that are argued to appear for less than a 
quarter of a second and in a particular context may suggest that an individual is 
deceiving.62  There is evidence for variations in the occurrence of facial 
expressions, in particular, some expressions appearing in the upper or lower face, 
some emotions appearing easier to fake than others, micro-expressions 
presenting for longer than anticipated, occurring more in high intensity 
emotional displays, appearing in truthful and deceptive accounts, and less 
frequently than anticipated.63  It is argued that the context of an interaction and 
its effect on an individual results in micro-expressions exposing true emotions; 
however the impact of individual differences is largely unknown. 
                                                     
60 Ekman, Paul. Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics and Marriage 
(London: W.W Norton & Company, 2001); Bella DePaulo, James Lindsay, Brian Malone, 
Laura Muhlenbruck, Kelly Charlton and Harris Cooper, “Cues to deception,” Psychological 
Bulletin 129 (2003): 74-118. 
61 Leanne ten Brinke, Sarah MacDonald, Stephen Porter and Brian O’Connor, “Crocodile 
tears: Facial, verbal and body language behaviors  associated with genuine and fabricated 
remorse,” Law and Human Behavior 36 (2012): 51-59; Leanne ten Brinke and Stephen 
Porter, “Cry me a river: Identifying the behavioural consequences of extremely high-stakes 
interpersonal deception,” Law and Human Behavior 36 (2012): 469-477; Leanne ten Brinke, 
Stephen Porter and Alysha Baker, “Darwin the detective: Observable facial muscles reveal 
emotional high-stakes lies,” Evolution and Human Behavior 33 (2012) 411-416. 
62 Ekman, Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics and Marriage. 
63 Stephen Porter and Leanne ten Brinke, “Reading between the lies: How do facial 
expressions reveal concealed and fabricated emotions?,” Psychological Science 19 (2008): 
508-514; Stephen Porter and Leanne ten Brinke, “The truth about lies: What works in 
detecting high-stakes deception?,” Legal and Criminological Psychology 14 (2010): 119-134; 
Stephen Porter, Leanne ten Brinke and Brendan Wallace, “Secrets and lies: Involuntary 
leakage in deceptive facial expressions as a function of emotional intensity,” Journal of 
Nonverbal Behavior 36 (2012): 23-37; ten Brinke, MacDonald, Porter and Brian O’Connor, 
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People may show discomfort when being interviewed and when engaging in 
deception in the form of manipulators, and illustrators, although these behaviors 
are not necessarily indicative of malign intent.64  Increased cognitive load may 
lead to a reduction in illustrators which may make deceivers appear tense whilst 
truth-tellers are likely to increase their illustrators to complement their 
narrative.65  The greatest challenge in interpreting such findings is to identify the 
extent to which they are applicable to non-student groups, for example, it is 
unclear whether non-students exhibit greater or fewer illustrator cues to 
deception.66  There is evidence that offenders may increase manipulators during 
fabricated stories suggesting that deceivers’ usage of these behaviors is context 
dependent or a strategy to distract from verbal content.67  Hence, the baseline of 
truthful behavior in a particular context of interest has to be established before 
judgements regarding deception can be made.  Non-verbal deception detection 
approaches have the potential to be used across real-world interactions and 
mediated interactions where there is visual content, and suspicious behavior 
based upon validated cues to deception may enable the identification of 
individual for further monitoring. 
 
Online Deception Detection 
Online deception detection approaches examine online verbal and linguistic 
content, features of the online environment that are used to make credibility 
judgements, identifying links between an individual’s real world and online 
persona and heuristics individuals rely on in credibility judgements.68  One 
approach related to analyzing features is the so-called ‘Theory of Deception,’ 
where individuals are argued to detect deception by noticing and interpreting 
anomalies in their environment through reference to the goals and aims ascribed 
to interactional partners.69  In testing this approach, in conjunction with a real 
website, a ‘hi-jacked’ website was created to replicate the real website and half the 
                                                     
64 Mark Frank, “Thoughts, feelings, and deception” in Brooke Harrington (ed.), Deception: 
From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 55-73. 
65 DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton and Cooper, “Cues to deception”; Frank, 
“Thoughts, feelings, and deception”; ten Brinke and Porter, “Cry me a river: Identifying the 
behavioural consequences of extremely high-stakes interpersonal deception”; Joe Navarro, “A 
four-domain model for detecting deception,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (June, 2003): 19-
24. 
66 Porter and ten Brinke, “The truth about lies: What works in detecting high-stakes 
deception?” 
67 Stephen Porter, Laura England, Marcus Juodis, Leanne ten Brinke and Kevin Wilson, “Is the 
face a window to the soul? Investigation of the accuracy of intuitive judgements of the 
trustworthiness of human faces,” Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science 40 (2008): 171-
177. 
68 See discussion of Verbal Deception Detection 
69 Stefano Grazioli, “Where did they go wrong? An analysis of the failure of knowledgeable 
internet consumers to detect deception over the internet,” Group Decision and Negotiation 13 
(2004): 149-172; Paul Johnson, Stefono Grazioli, Karim Jamal and R. Glen Berryman, 
“Detecting deception: Adversarial problem solving in a low base-rate world,” Cognitive 
Science 25 (2001): 355-392. 
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computer savvy sample was unknowingly directed to the ‘hi-jacked’ site.70  In 
correctly identifying the deceptive site, individuals used fewer but more accurate 
cues related to information assurance rather than trust and such strategies may 
be used upon individuals’ knowledge and use of a communication format 
alongside awareness of potential for deception online.71 
 
Further development of ‘Theory of Deception’ argues that the recipient’s 
individual disposition and perceptions are also vital for detecting cues to 
deception.72  Disposition to trust and Web experience are influences on detecting 
phishing, however computer self-efficacy, security knowledge, perceived risk, and 
suspicion of humanity may not be strong predictors of detection.73  In detecting 
phishing via email, there are two points of detection: The first point is before the 
email is opened, where email authentication cues are salient and second after the 
email is opened it becomes the only source of cues to deception.74  Once opened 
there is an initial authentication of the email and perceived cues to deception 
before suspicion is activated by the relationship between the cues, context and 
individual factors.75  Individual factors include sensitivity to the value of 
information, concern for privacy, obedience to authority and conscientiousness in 
judgement, whilst contextual factors were linked to knowledge of the institution.  
The third stage of deception detection involved individuals’ confirmation of 
suspicion.  The evaluation of the hypotheses was found to be related to two main 
categories: confirmation seeking of authenticity and individual investigation of 
authenticity.76 
 
Prominence-Interpretation Theory (PIT) argues that individuals assess credibility 
of websites through noticing features, judging them and then assigning 
credibility.77  Assignation of prominence is affected by user involvement, website 
content, the user task, user experience, and individual differences.78  User 
assumptions, skills and knowledge, context and goals are argued to be linked to 
the interpretation of features.79  Prominence-Interpretation Theory (PIT) focusses 
on the content and interpretation of the user in assessing credibility of websites, 
                                                     
70 Grazioli, “Where did they go wrong? An analysis of the failure of knowledgeable internet 
consumers to detect deception over the internet.” 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ryan Wright, Suranjan Chakraborty, Asli Basoglu and Kent Marett, “Where did they go 
right? Understanding the deception in phishing communications,” Group Decision and 
Negotiation 19 (2010): 391-416. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Fogg, BJ, “Prominence-interpretation theory: Explaining how people assess credibility,” 
CHI ’03, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, April 5-10, 2003; Fogg, BJ, Cathy Soohoo, David 
Danielson, Leslie Marable, Julianne Stanford and Ellen Yauber, “How do users evaluate the 
credibility of web sites?: A study with over 2,500 participants,” DUX ’03, New York, New 
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78 Ibid. 
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however, it seems possible that individual may assess credibility in this manner in 
other contexts including other forms of online content and has the potential for 
expansion to face-to-face situations. 
 
Individuals are argued to use different prominent features to assess credibility of 
websites based upon the website context.80  For example, e-commerce sites are 
judged according to their reputation and recognition, whilst news sites are judged 
according to perceived bias of information, non-profit organizations are judged 
according to their identity, and opinion/review sites are judged according to their 
information bias and accuracy with further judgements informed by individuals 
user experience.81 Knowledge of how individuals construct credibility of websites 
based upon their features is important to understand, however, when dealing 
with deception in strategic environments false online content may have plausible 
features leading to inaccurate judgements of credibility. 
 
When people are engaging in activities, including deception, depending on the 
nature of the behavior there can be ‘warrants’, for example, organizational 
credential’s in an email account or a profile photo in an online social network, 
which enable links to be examined between an individual’s real-world and online 
identities.82  Individuals may deceive more frequently in online chat 
environments that enable greater anonymity, and less often in the use of email 
where warrants are visible.  The stakes of such interactions and the intent of the 
deceiver are critical to ascertain in such situations, particularly those involving 
criminal activities and breaches of security.  Although examining warrants may be 
a useful strategy for assessing credibility in low-stakes online interactions, in 
high-stakes interactions this may be more troublesome where motivation, 
resources and ability to manipulate identity may enable a convincing false 
warrant’ to be displayed. 
 
Uncovering hidden deception and malign intent across interpersonal and online 
environments can include the identification of ‘digital footprints’, ‘digital 
exhaust,’ or ‘scent trails’ that can be coupled with other forms of evidence such as 
surveillance footage.83  Although rarely the focus of traditional deception 
approaches, examining patterns of behavior, including email communications, 
online statements and online searches of information about potential targets may 
                                                     
80 Fogg, Soohoo, Danielson, Marable, Stanford and Yauber, “How do users evaluate the 
credibility of web sites?: A study with over 2,500 participants.” 
81 Ibid. 
82 Warkentin, Darcy, Michael Woodworth, Jeffrey Hancock and Nicole Cormier “Warrants 
and deception in computer mediated communication,” CSCW, Savannah, Georgia, February 
6-10, 2010. 
83 Peter Forster, “Countering Individual Jihad: Perspectives on Nidal Hasan and Colleen 
LaRose,” CTX 2 (2012): 1-11; Sandham, Alexandra, Thomas Ormerod, Coral Dando, Ray Bull, 
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enable the identification of concealed actions.84  When drawing from tactical to 
strategic level deception detection, a proactive stance is required, where potential 
threats are monitored to ensure that information is collated and assessed for 
deceit.  Furthermore, there is potential for collected evidence to be later used in 
investigative interviews with which to challenge suspects’ narratives. 
 
Further understanding of how credibility judgements are made regarding online 
content focuses upon construction of credibility, heuristics, and interaction, or 
how such strategies amalgamate.85  The construct level examines how individuals 
construct credibility, which in turn influences how they judge credibility.86  The 
heuristics level involves judgement strategies that are used across multiple 
contexts, whilst the interaction level focuses on judgements based upon source 
and content cues.87  Heuristics identified from a U.S. sample include reputation, 
endorsement, consistency, self-confirmation, expectancy violation, and 
persuasive intent.88  Although there is difficulty in sorting heuristics into explicit 
categories as processes may occur simultaneously in decision-making, and 
contexts may generate multiple heuristics, alongside one heuristic activating 
another.89  The interaction level focuses upon individuals’ interactions with a 
website and neglects the online interactions that occur between individuals that 
require credibility judgements that will be influenced by interpersonal dynamics.  
Furthermore, the framework proposed does not focus upon the accuracy of 
credibility judgements in identifying truth and deception. 
 
Psychological Synthesis 
To effectively understand and challenge the myriad forms of deception across 
varying contexts and communication mediums, alongside identifying emerging 
strategic deception there is a requirement for a synthesis of approaches.  Such a 
synthesis will incorporate multiple deception detection techniques that will be 
tailored to reflect the context of the interaction, and it is acknowledged that not 
all techniques will be relevant for all interactions.  Where possible in-depth 
analysis of the actors involved in deception should be conducted to understand 
the culture and motives from which strategic deception will emerge, and enable 
the identification of personalities that may present additional challenges to 
practitioners.  Intelligence, surveillance and evidence will aid practitioners once 
sources and evidence have been verified for authenticity, they can enable the 
identification of truth or deception by individuals, or where such evidence proves 
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inconclusive it will provide further justification for the surveillance of individuals 
of interest.90  Once individuals have been identified as deceptive or flagged for 
further monitoring, social network analysis of these individuals should be 
conducted to identify further threats and deception targeted at strategic interests. 
 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Evidence 
Intelligence, surveillance, and evidence play a crucial role in uncovering 
deception by individuals and groups. Intelligence, surveillance, and evidence 
techniques may be used to identify potential threats, uncover links between 
individuals and groups, and contrast with individuals’ accounts to ensure 
credibility. Intelligence and evidence can be used in investigative interviews to 
elicit greater behavioral differences between truth-tellers and deceivers. Whilst 
surveillance techniques can provide further monitoring of individuals who are 
suspected of deception if there is no current evidence.  However, caveats of these 
techniques exist, as they are required to operate within the laws of the affected 
nation, and sources of information alongside the content need to be verified for 
credibility to ensure reliability of evidence. 
 
There are varieties of forms of intelligence available to practitioners to assist them 
in their analyses, whether in criminal, security and other strategic environments. 
91  HUMINT, image intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), open 
source intelligence (OSINT), and more recently social media intelligence 
(SOCMINT) all enable practitioners to develop comprehensive accounts of 
actions whether committed by an individual or a group.92  However, to ensure the 
credibility of such intelligence requires verification of the source of information 
through an approach tailored by the techniques outlined above, and of the 
information, such source or communication channel provides.  For example, 
linguistic analysis techniques may be used to assess the credibility HUMINT, 
OSINT and SOCMINT, whilst Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) may be used to 
assess the reliability of IMINT and SIGINT.  Once intelligence and evidence is 
verified, it can then be used to assess the reliability of statements or used as 
evidence to elicit behavioral differences between truth-tellers and deceivers.  
Social network analysis however may be used to uncover links between actors and 
identify where strategic deception may be emerging.93 
 
                                                     
90 Scott Schumate and Randy Borum, “Psychological support to defense counterintelligence 
operations,” Military Psychology 18 (2006): 283-296. 
91 Sir David Omand, Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller, “Introducing social media intelligence 
(SOCMINT),” Intelligence and National Security 27 (2012): 801-823. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Melonie Richet and Matthias Binz, “Open source collection methods for identifying radical 
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Actors 
To enhance understanding of deception an understanding of the individuals and 
organizations involved in deception is required.  Practitioners in operational 
environments have readily accepted this premise, where enhanced understanding 
of culture and elements of personality has been required across 
counterintelligence.94  Understanding how individuals present themselves in 
interactions has particular relevance to HUMINT interviews where gathered 
intelligence can have large-scale ramifications if it is accepted as credible when it 
is not. 
 
The acceptance and likelihood of engaging in forms of deception may be based on 
exclusive or multiple personality traits alongside the motive and context of 
behavioral interactions.95  There are disorders related to deception, pathological 
lying and instrumental gain that need to be considered by practitioners as 
potential explanations for suspects’ motives and behavior and will present 
additional challenges in detecting deception that affects strategic interests.  
Psychopathy, Narcissism and Machiavellianism are three such personality 
constructs that will present additional challenges for practitioners.96  Although 
not all individuals will have such personalities, practitioners nevertheless still 
require understanding of how such personalities manifest across individuals, 
groups and communication mediums. 
 
The impact of cultural differences on understanding deception is critical in the 
globalized world.  Deception is an evolutionary trait found in varying forms in 
every culture in the world, although different cultures have different beliefs 
regarding deception; for example, amongst Arabic people deception is acceptable 
if an individual is seeking societal approval.97  When people are communicating in 
different languages their ability to detect deception will be affected by language 
                                                     
94 Richet and Binz, “Open source collection methods for identifying radical extremists using 
social media”; Schumate and Borum, “Psychological support to defense counterintelligence 
operations.” 
95 Beverley McLeod and Randy Genereux, “Predicting the acceptability and likelihood of lying: 
The interaction of personality with type of lie,” Personality and Individual Differences 45 
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and it is hard to analyze whether this will benefit the deceiver or the target.98  
Cognitive load approaches to deception detection have also sought to detect 
deception in those from other nations and cultures.99  ACID has been found to 
detect deception in Arabic, Spanish, and English from a range of cultures and has 
found similar impression management strategies in English and Chinese 
speakers.100  Forensic statement analysis has further enabled discrimination 
between truthful and deceptive Arabic speakers whilst forced-choice questioning 
has also led to accurate identification of truthful and deceptive Russian and 
Vietnamese speakers.101  
 
The CHAMELEON Approach to Interviewing (CAI) is a personality led 
investigative interview approach that takes into account a far wider breadth of 
information than traditional investigative interview approaches.102  In dealing 
with individuals, it is acknowledged that every offender/suspect has the potential 
to be different from each other, to be different at different times, to behave 
differently with different people, to behave differently across different actions 
committed, to behave differently across different interviews, and to be different 
within each interview.103  Individuals will have different backgrounds, life 
experiences, attitudes, beliefs, offences, and modus operandi (MO).  Each 
individual has the potential to vary in his or her cognitive ability, his or her affect, 
and his or her cooperativeness at different times.  There will also be endogenous 
and exogenous effects on an individual such that each will behave differently with 
different interactional partners due to personal dynamics including, age, gender 
and socio-economic status and previous experience with people and what are 
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those people’s objectives.  Each individual will be different within and across 
interviews due to how penetrative questions are the subtlety of questions, and the 
degree of incriminations as the interview progresses. 
 
Application to a Multi-Incident Terrorist Scenario: 
Across modern operating environments, scenarios have been used to increase 
ability to respond to challenges posed by a variety of groups including, amongst 
others, terrorist organizations.  Following recent terrorist incidents in Western 
nations including the failed Thalys train attack, the San Bernadino attack in the 
United States, the recent multi-location attacks in Paris and Brussels, and the 
resurgence of an active IRA, there is a need to develop complex scenarios. 
Scenarios are used to highlight how such incidences may be countered through 
understanding how multiple incidences of deception may enable a large-scale 
attack, alongside the objectives of individuals and groups involved in such 
activity.  Scenario use for examining futures has been conducted across a wide 
range of areas, including in strategic planning, management, and business, the 
risk assessment and management of offenders, and in red-teaming terrorist 
scenarios.104  Scenarios may be used as decision-making tools to overcome 
limitations and enable preparation for the unexpected and the construction of 
meaning from uncertainty and ambiguity through developing creative future 
responses.105  Scenarios are socially constructed narratives, which integrate 
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predetermined events with critical uncertainties to encourage future thinking and 
are not predictions or forecasts of the future.106 
 
Methodology 
The explorative approach to scenario development is a qualitative approach 
examining the structural uncertainty of futures to gain awareness and critical 
insight.107 This approach has clearly defined goals, and the current research 
focuses on a deception issues-based scenario to illustrate how multiple acts of 
deception may be detected through multiple techniques for detecting deceit 
through monitoring intelligence, surveillance and evidence alongside an 
understanding of individuals’ personality, motive and mindset. 108  Qualitative or 
narrative scenarios are considered appropriate for analysis of complex situations 
where there are high levels of uncertainty as they enable greater flexibility in 
adapting to threats and the scenario to be used to illustrate this approach falls 
within this remit.109 Presented below is a scenario outlining a potential terrorist 
incident across multiple sites and how such incidents may be detected through 
tailored deception detection approaches. 
 
The Scenario 
A terrorist incident involving multiple actors in a capital city, for example, 
London, occurs across multiple locations.  The group involved is required to 
conceal their true aims and motives and operate at a covert level during the 
planning of their operations, including their target selection and preparation of 
explosive devices and weapons and ammunition.  Following the careful selection 
of their targets, the group aims to create maximum confusion and distract 
authorities from being able to respond effectively to the threats posed by them, 
providing them a greater opportunity to achieve their aims.  The initial target 
selected for a mass casualty suicide-improvised explosive device (suicide-IED) 
attack was a public shopping center with a large crowd of people, which would 
create a large amount of media exposure for the group’s aims.  A second key 
suicide-IED attack location was a busy shopping street in the center of London.  A 
third location for an attack by suicide-IEDs using automatic weapons was a 
cinema complex, whilst a fourth location was a popular restaurant.  While these 
attacks are aimed to occur over a short space of time to reduce the emergency 
services effectiveness in responding to this threat, small explosive devices were 
also planted at multiple locations around London.  These devices were designed 
to create attention and panic amongst members of the public and draw 
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emergency service responses away from the actual intended targets.  These 
devices were also planted across a range of locations, which did not actually 
reflect the aims, or ideology of the group made it harder to ascertain the groups’ 
aims. 
 
Methods of Detection 
Intelligence derived from HUMINT, IMINT and SIGINT may be used to identify 
suspects during the planning stages of the attack.  Such identification may occur 
during target surveillance where individuals may be seen across multiple 
locations and their non-verbal behavior assessed for potential cues indicative of 
deceit or concealed intent.  Such analysis may be combined with SIGINT where 
communication between suspected terrorists may be intercepted and analyzed 
according to linguistic approaches to deception detection and online credibility 
assessment perspectives.  Further, surveillance may identify suspects who are 
buying materials being used to manufacture explosive devices.   
 
If suspects are intercepted based upon evidence generated from intelligence and 
surveillance approaches, then further HUMINT may be developed from the use of 
interviewing techniques.  Verbal and non-verbal deception detection techniques 
can be employed to assess credibility in suspects and compare and contrast their 
statements with evidence generated from IMINT and SIGINT.  In interactions 
with the suspects, it is important to understand how their beliefs will inform their 
actions and interview strategies will need to be tailored accordingly.  If non-
verbal behaviors indicative of deceit are encountered during suspect interviews, 
suspect’s non-verbal behaviors will provide useful guides for practitioner to 
question further. 
 
In the event that the suspected terrorists are not intercepted, then the terrorist 
attack may occur and a different approach to deception detection will be required.  
Surveillance from IMINT sources including CCTV cameras will provide evidence 
of where each explosion occurs.  To minimize casualties, authorities require an 
effective emergency response where they can distinguish between genuine and 
distraction explosions.  The use of SMEs in identifying the differences between 
the genuine and distraction explosions will enable the emergency services to 
allocate their resources effectively potentially reducing the number of casualties.  
While techniques related to pre-detection and alternative analyses, may enable a 
more robust response to the threats posed by anticipating the likelihood of an 
adversary course of action.  If the course of an action is more likely to be 
anticipated, then it may be prevented or detected before the threat occurs. 
 
Conclusion 
The current article highlighted a range of techniques that may be used towards 
detecting deception and applying such techniques whilst keeping an open mind 
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towards the possibilities of a larger deception may prove useful in detecting 
strategic deception.  To illustrate how a tailored approach to deception detection 
may be deployed against multiple threats a scenario involving a terrorist attack 
was outlined alongside potential strategies of how to detect deception at different 
points across the scenario.  While such an approach enables the ability to 
envisage new approaches to deception detection for practitioners, the approach to 
deception detection combining behavioral cues to deceit alongside a 
consideration of personality and motive will require validation both in 
experimental and real-world conditions.  The list of techniques discussed is not 
exhaustive and it is anticipated that many techniques will be refined over time to 
produce greater accuracy in deception detection.  One key point to note is that 
deceptive behavior is not generic and attempts at deception will reflect the 
surrounding aims, culture, and personalities of those individuals involved in 
large-scale deception and this will differ accordingly between and within 
organizations involved in committing deception for strategic gain. 
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